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PRECEDENTIAL 
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
  
No. 15-3635 
_____________ 
 
GREG HARGUS 
 
v. 
 
FEROCIOUS AND IMPETUOUS, LLC;  
KYLE COLEMAN; JOSEPH TRATTNER;  
ST. THOMAS SPORT AND SOCIAL CLUB;  
M/V ONE LOVE 
 
Kyle Coleman; M/V One Love, 
                                                Appellants 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.V.I. No. 3-13-cv-00111) 
District Judge: Honorable Ruth Miller 
______________ 
 
Argued May 19, 2016  
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit 
Judges 
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(Filed: October 18, 2016) 
 
Matthew J. Duensing  [ARGUED] 
5060 Fort Straede, Electra House, P.O. Box 6785 
St. Thomas, United States Virgin Islands 00802 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellants Kyle Coleman and the M/V One Love (the 
“One Love”)1 appeal the District Court’s judgment in favor of 
Appellee Greg Hargus on his negligence claim following a 
bench trial.  For the reasons discussed below, we conclude 
that the tortious act giving rise to Hargus’ claim was 
insufficient to invoke maritime jurisdiction because the act 
was not of the type that could potentially disrupt maritime 
commerce.  Therefore, the District Court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over Hargus’ personal injury claim.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand the matter with instructions that the District 
Court dismiss the case. 
 
 
                                              
1 The One Love is a twenty-six foot recreational 
vessel. 
3 
 
I. 
On May 19, 2012, Hargus and a group of individuals 
rented the One Love to travel from St. Thomas to various 
destinations throughout the United States Virgin Islands.2  
Ferocious and Impetuous, LLC (“F&I”) owned the One Love 
and had hired Coleman as a captain.  One of the stops on the 
tour was Cruz Bay, St. John, where Coleman anchored the 
One Love in “knee deep” water close to the shore.  (App. 30, 
271.)  Most of the passengers then disembarked from the One 
Love.  Later in the day, two members of the group—who 
were standing on the beach approximately 25 feet away from 
the One Love—threw beer cans at Hargus while he was 
standing on the deck of the anchored One Love.  Upon seeing 
this, Coleman, who was standing on the beach next to the 
other two individuals, threw an empty insulated plastic coffee 
cup at Hargus.  The plastic cup hit Hargus in the temple on 
the left side of his head.  Hargus, however, did not lose 
consciousness and did not complain of any injury at that time.  
One Love resumed its journey without further incident.  
 On May 21, 2012, two days after the incident, Hargus, 
who had experienced pain and vision impairments after being 
hit by the coffee cup, sought medical attention.  He was 
diagnosed with a concussion and a mild contusion.3  The 
treating physician did not prescribe any medication and 
                                              
 
2 The factual recitation is based largely upon the 
Findings of Fact made by the District Court following the 
Bench Trial.  (App. 29-33.) 
 
 
3
 Hargus had a history of head trauma, having 
previously suffered 10 to 12 head injuries or concussions. 
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allowed Hargus to return to work that day without 
restrictions.   
Hargus did not seek further medical treatment until 
more than a year later.  From June of 2013 until October of 
2013, he was examined by at least three doctors for 
complaints of headaches, memory loss, mood swings, and 
neck pain.  He last sought treatment for his headaches and 
other symptoms in October of 2013. 
On November 20, 2013, Hargus filed the instant 
lawsuit in the District Court of the Virgin Islands against 
Coleman, F&I, Joseph Trattner (owner of F&I), Brent 
Hazzard, St. Thomas Sport and Social Club, and the One 
Love, in rem.  In his Amended Complaint, Hargus asserted 
five claims: (1) a maritime lien against the One Love; (2) 
negligence and negligent entrustment against F&I, Trattner, 
Hazzard, and the St. Thomas Sport and Social Club; (3) 
negligence against Coleman; and (5) vicarious liability 
against F&I, Trattner, Hazzard, and the St. Thomas Sport and 
Social Club.  The District Court held a two-day bench trial on 
Hargus’ claims on February 24 and 25, 2015.   
On September 30, 2015, the District Court issued its 
opinion, explaining that it had admiralty jurisdiction over 
Hargus’ claims because “[c]laims such as these for personal 
injury to the passenger of a vessel caused by the captain of 
the vessel meet the situs and nexus requirements for admiralty 
tort jurisdiction of this Court.”  (App. 44.)  The District Court 
further concluded that Coleman was negligent and that the 
One Love was jointly and severally liable in rem.  However, 
the District Court found that F&I and Trattner were not liable 
for negligence or negligent entrustment and were not 
vicariously liable.  Thereafter, the District Court entered 
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judgment in favor of Hargus and against Coleman and the 
One Love, jointly and severally, in the amount of $50,000.  
Coleman and the One Love timely filed this appeal.4   
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final order 
of the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de 
novo review over the District Court’s determination of its 
own admiralty jurisdiction.  Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015); 
Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 1991).   
Under the United States Constitution, the federal 
judicial power encompasses “all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
Congress codified that jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), 
which provides that federal district courts have original 
jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime 
jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).  “The fundamental 
interest giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is ‘the protection 
of maritime commerce.’”  Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 
(1990) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 
668, 674 (1982)).  
When a party seeks to invoke federal admiralty 
jurisdiction over a tort claim, the claim “must satisfy 
conditions both of location and of connection with maritime 
activity.”  Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 
                                              
 
4 It bears noting that no entry of appearance was made 
on behalf of Hargus.  Nor was a brief filed on his behalf and 
neither Hargus nor an attorney acting on his behalf 
participated in oral argument. 
6 
 
Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995).  The location aspect is 
satisfied if “the tort occurred on navigable water” or the 
“injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable 
water.”  Id.  The connection aspect is a conjunctive two-part 
inquiry.  First, we “must ‘assess the general features of the 
type of incident involved’ to determine whether the incident 
has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.’”  
Id. (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, 364 n.2).  Second, we 
“must determine whether ‘the general character’ of the 
‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial 
relationship to traditional maritime activity.’”  Id. (quoting 
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364 n.2, 365).  Federal admiralty 
jurisdiction is only proper when the location test and both 
prongs of the connection test are satisfied.  Id.   
Here, even assuming the location test is satisfied, we 
find that admiralty jurisdiction is lacking because the first 
prong of the connection test is not met.  The first prong of the 
connection test analyzes whether “the general features of the 
type of incident involved” have “a potentially disruptive 
impact on maritime commerce.”  Id. (quoting Sisson, 497 
U.S. at 363, 364 n.2).  This analysis requires us to assess the 
“potential” disruptive effects that the type of incident 
involved could have on maritime commerce, not whether the 
particular incident at hand actually disrupted maritime 
commerce.  Id. at 538–39.  In so doing, we must describe the 
incident “at an intermediate level of possible generality.”  Id. 
at 538.  The purpose of this exercise is to ascertain “whether 
the incident could be seen within a class of incidents that 
posed more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping.”  Id. 
at 539.   
Several cases illustrate the proper analysis.  In Sisson, 
a fire broke out on a recreational vessel that was docked at a 
7 
 
marina, destroying that vessel and damaging several 
recreational vessels nearby and the marina.  497 U.S. at 360.  
The Supreme Court described the incident as “a fire on a 
vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters,” and 
concluded that this type of incident has the potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce because the fire could have 
spread to a nearby commercial vessel or made the marina 
inaccessible for commercial vessels.  Id. at 362-63.   
Likewise, in Grubart, a construction company that was 
using a crane on a barge in the Chicago River allegedly 
cracked a freight tunnel running under the river, causing 
water to pour into the tunnel and flood buildings downtown.  
513 U.S. at 530.  The Supreme Court described that incident 
as “damage by a vessel in navigable water to an underwater 
structure,” and concluded that this type of incident has the 
potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it “could lead 
to a disruption in the water course itself” or “could lead to 
restrictions on the navigational use of the waterway during 
required repairs.”  Id. at 539; see also Foremost Ins. Co., 457 
U.S. at 675 (describing a collision between two pleasure boats 
as “a collision between boats on navigable water” and 
concluding that such an incident has the potential to disrupt 
maritime commerce because a collision between boats in an 
area with heavy commercial boat traffic would have a 
“substantial effect on maritime commerce”); id. at 675 n.5 
(explaining that, in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of 
Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972), the Supreme Court 
concluded that a plane crashing into the water had the 
potential to disrupt maritime commerce because “an aircraft 
sinking in the water could create a hazard for the navigation 
of commercial vessels in the vicinity”).    
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On the other hand, in Tandon v. Captain’s Cove 
Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014), the 
court concluded that a brawl on a permanent floating dock 
between passengers of two boats did not have the potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce.  In that case, two separate groups 
of individuals (the “Tandon group” and the “Genna group”) 
traveled by separate boats to a marina restaurant for dinner 
and drinks.  Id. at 241.  As both groups left the restaurant and 
boarded their boats, a member of the Tandon group fell into 
the water.  Id.  Members of the Genna group laughed at the 
mishap, leading members of the Tandon group to yell 
unspecified comments in response.  Id.  Both groups then 
proceeded by boat to the South Dock—a floating dock 
accessible only by water—and docked their respective 
vessels.  Id. at 242.  Once both groups disembarked from their 
vessels onto the South Dock, a fistfight broke out, during 
which one member of the Genna group was knocked off the 
South Dock and into the water.  Id.  The individual also 
alleged that he was then held underwater to the point of 
asphyxia and suffered severe injuries as a result.  Id. 
In analyzing the potential for this type of incident to 
disrupt maritime commerce, the Second Circuit described the 
incident as “a physical altercation among recreational visitors 
on and around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable 
water.”  Id. at 249.  The Court explained that, unlike Grubart, 
this type of incident cannot disrupt navigation because “it 
does not create any obstruction to the free passage of 
commercial ships along navigable waterways.  Nor can it lead 
to a disruption in the course of the waterway itself.”  Id.  
Furthermore, the Court noted that, unlike Sisson, this incident 
“cannot immediately damage nearby commercial vessels” and 
“threatens only its participants.”  Id.  Moreover, the Court 
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found that because the incident did not occur while the parties 
were at sea, the incident could not “distract the crew from 
their duties, endangering the safety of the vessel and risking 
collision with others on the same waterway” or force the 
vessel “to divert from its course to obtain medical care for the 
injured person.”  Id. at 250.  Finally, the Court noted that the 
injured individual was not “employed in maritime 
commerce.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Second Circuit concluded 
that “this type of incident does not realistically pose a threat 
to maritime commerce.”  Id. at 249. 
Here, the activity in question can be described as 
throwing a small inert object from land at an individual 
onboard an anchored vessel.  Like the fistfight in Tandon, we 
find that this type of incident “does not realistically pose a 
threat to maritime commerce.”  Id.  First, unlike damage to an 
underwater structure, see Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538–39, or a 
collision between two vessels, see Foremost Insurance Co., 
457 U.S. at 675, throwing an inert object from land onto an 
anchored vessel does not create any potential for disrupting 
the course of the waterway or obstructing the free passage of 
commercial ships on the waterway.  Second, unlike a fire on a 
marina, see Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363, or a plane crashing into 
the water, see Foremost Insurance Co., 457 U.S. at 675 n.5, 
throwing an inert object from land onto an anchored vessel 
has no potential to damage nearby commercial vessels.   
In sum, throwing an object like a coffee cup from land 
at an individual standing on an anchored vessel does not 
threaten a disruptive effect on maritime commerce because it 
does not have the potential of disrupting navigation, 
damaging nearby commercial vessels, or causing a 
commercial vessel to divert from its course.  Accordingly, 
Hargus’ claims do not satisfy the first prong of the two-prong 
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connection test, rendering the invocation of federal admiralty 
jurisdiction inappropriate.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment of September 30, 2015 and remand the 
matter with instructions that the District Court dismiss the 
case.  
 
